Introduce script only include/require
- Currently inactive
- Target version: 7.0
- Approved at 14.3%
PHP RFC: Introduce script only include/require
include()/require() is source of file/script inclusion for a long time. Script inclusion is extremely severe security breach and PHP is too weak against script inclusion attacks with respect to other languages.
The Root of This Difference
The root cause of the difference is how scripts are loaded.
Python loads script like
where foo is foo.py.
Ruby loads script like
where foo is foo.rb.
PHP loads script like
where foo.php is the script loaded. i.e. Raw/full filename is specified as script to be loaded.
Other languages provides loading script without file extension. This prevents “script inclusion” attacks effectively. Above number of vulnerabilities is the proof.
There are other reasons that PHP is weaker than other languages.
- PHP is embedded language by default. Therefore, many users use include/require for loading templates. i.e. Users casually use script loading include/require with variables.
- Embedded mode cannot be disabled. Even when only script is needed, users have to use include/require. Users casually use script loading include/require with variables as custom due to PHP's embed nature.
- In other languages, even if there is vulnerability in script loading code, they cannot read any files unlike PHP. PHP allows to read any files like require('/etc/passwd').
One of the main reason why people start using scripting languages is security. However, PHP is extremely weaker against script/file inclusion compare to other language above reasons.
Even though this RFC does not change PHP's embed anything feature, this RFC changes security impacts of above aspects.
Solution for this issue is simple. Introduce script only include/require and modify move_uploaded_file() function not to move PHP script embedded files. With this RFC, PHP becomes as secure as other languages against script/file inclusion attacks via script loading features.
Do not see how this RFC prevent script inclusion attacks
- include*()/require*() refuse to compile/execute file extensions other than “.php .phar” by default.
- move_uploaded_file() refuse to move PHP script. “.php .phar” is refused by default.
With this RFC, include*()/require*() only executes files have “.php” or “.phar” extension and move_uploaded_file() refuse to move uploaded files that can be executed as PHP script. Therefore, even most obvious mistake like 'include $_GET[“var”];' will not work anymore. i.e. It cannot read files like “include '/etc/passwd';” nor execute script like “include '/path/to/upload/evil_image.jpg';”.
This RFC gives false sense of security like magic_quotes/etc
This is not true. This RFC does not change any inputs, does not have any cons except slight BC issue. This RFC protects users from security disaster. If you insist this RFC gives false sense of security, give reasons why. When user write code like 'include $_GET[“var”];' or 'move_uploaded_file($src, “/path/to/upload/mygreatscript.php”);', PHP dies with E_ERROR/warns with E_WARNING. This is not false sense of security, but actual security warning that users must take care of.
Why not check embedded script in parser?
Checking embedded PHP script by parser/etc never works. For example, text file with PHP script example is valid file. If we forbid embedded PHP script, we forbid valid file also.
This RFC breaks too many applications
This can be fixed by one liner.
ini_set('zend.script_extensions', '.php .phtml .inc .module .etc'); or ini_set('zend.script_extensions', ''); // The same as now. Disable mitigations. Not recommended.
ini_set() does not emit any errors. Therefore, this one liner works for all PHP versions.
My app has special entry point like .gif/.html
If you are running PHP as web server module, you can use any file extensions as PHP scripts. See “Implementation Details”.
OS protection is not perfect protection
OS protection works well for system files. However, any applications support file uploads can be attacked by inclusion attacks. e.g. require('../../upload/evil_file') can be done with bad PHP code.
open_basedir is not helpful
open_basedir restrict file reads, but it's not helpful. Attackers use uploaded files to exploit PHP applications. These uploaded files are images, document, etc. Session data file is common target for attackers also.
Even though move_upload_file() is obsolete function, users are supposed to use move_uploaded_file() function to move uploaded files to destination directory. move_uploaded_files() is modified to prevent/refuse to move “PHP scripts” without user setting.
Note: Currently, there is no real difference between rename() and move_uploaded_file() as long as users use tmp filename in $_FILES for source path.
Do not like new INI
It is our responsibility that provides reasonable security measures against fatal security breach if it is feasible. This RFC provides systematic security measures against script/file inclusion vulnerability. New INI cannot be good reason to refuse this RFC that closes major security hole in PHP programs.
Users must be careful in first place
I totally agree with this opinion. Users must be careful. However, many PHP developers/users suffer “script inclusion vulnerability” unlike other languages. “Script inclusion vulnerability” is fatal and unacceptable risk. Therefore, we are better to have mitigations.
Introduce php script extension configuration:
zend.script_extensions = ".php .phar" ; Allow only *.php and *.phar. User may add/change this INI setting.
zend.script_extensions = NULL ; Allow any file for CLI by default. Where NULL is empty or ''
PHP checks file extension if it is allowed to load as PHP script when loading scripts by require/require_once/include/include_once.
If file does not have expected extension, require/require_once/include/include_once emits E_ERROR.
Introduce $allow_script flag to move_uploaded_file():
bool move_uploaded_file(string $filename , string $destination [, $allow_script=FALSE ] )
With current PHP, move_uploaded_file() has no real protection. Add new flag and make it useful again. It returns FALSE and raises E_WARNING for PHP script when $allow_script=FALSE.
- Detect “<?php” at the top of file and disallow “?>”: This still allows to load PHP script like 'require “image.png”;'/etc.
- Introduce script()/script_once(): The same issue as above.
- Introduce embed_mode INI: The same issue as above.
Backward Incompatible Changes
- If users have different filename extensions other than de facto standard, they have to modify “zend.script_extensions” INI or they can completely disable mitigations by 'ini_set(“zend.script_extensions”, “”)'.
- move_uploaded_file() cannot move PHP scripts unless $allow_script=TRUE. Note: ini_set(“zend.script_extensions”, “”) allows to move any files.
Proposed PHP Version(s)
- New “zend.script_extensions” INI - “.php .phar” are allowed as PHP script. See implementation details also.
- New “zend.script_extensions” INI - No BC impact since it allows any file as PHP script by default. Users may set zend.script_extensions to use mitigations.
To Existing Extensions
Extensions that have custom script loader with custom extension. “zend.script_extensions” modification may be needed to work.
zend.script_extensions: INI_ALL. Script may modify this at anytime.
- hardcoded default values
- Web SAPI: “.php .phar”
- CLI SAPI: NULL
- php.ini-development values
- NULL (Empty. Use the default)
- php.ini-production values
- NULL (Empty. Use the default)
- Error type for include/require - Use E_ERROR
- Vote type - Use 2/3
Unaffected PHP Functionality
All of require/require_once/include/include_once are affected by this.
- Allow script without PHP tag.
Patches and Tests
The patch does not protect “direct access”. i.e. It allows to execute PHP scripts specified by web server configurations when PHP is a module of web server. e.g.
<FilesMatch \.png$> SetHandler application/x-http-php </FilesMatch>
allows “.png” files to be executed as PHP script regardless of “zend.script_extensions”. When PHP script files are opened by Web server, PHP will not check file extensions. The patch checks extensions only when script files are loaded by PHP/Zend.
The patch works only under non-ZTS build currently. Under ZTS build, move_uploaded_file() does not work. This issue is addressed before merge.
- the version(s) it was merged to
- a link to the git commit(s)
- a link to the PHP manual entry for the feature
Keep this updated with features that were discussed on the mail lists.
|5||Added more Discussions|
|4||Added Implementation Details section|
|3||Added patch. Adjusted RFC for code optimization.|
|2||Changed php_scripts to zend.script_extensions.|
|1||Added error type/INI type. Fixed typo.|
An option needs 2/3 votes to win
|Introduce script inclusion protection? (14.3% approved)|